The long overdue Commands- particularly the SF- were aimed at dispelling enduring inter-service and intra-service rivalries for funding and reducing asset duplication, particularly in communication and network-centric systems and aerial platforms like helicopters. These followed the May 2012 recommendations of the 14-member Naresh Chandra National Security Review Committee, set up by the Congress Party-led federal collation to evaluate the progress in defence reforms introduced after the 1999 Kargil conflict. Proposals to establish a unified SF command headed by the Indian Army- alongside those for Space and Cyberspace led by the IAF and IN respectively – announced in early 2013, are nowhere near fruition. In turn, the army, claiming insufficient support from the IAF, plans to create two special aviation squadrons for its SF further duplicating scarce assets. This needlessly duplicated the NSGs role as a counter-terrorism force to tackle hijackings a decade earlier. The IAF, for instance, cited inadequate cooperation from the army in 2004 as its operational rationale for raising, at great expense, its own Garud counter-terrorism and anti-hijacking force. This includes dedicated air support to ensure insertion and extraction of SF units, coordinated armed reconnaissance and close air support missions to depreciate vital enemy assets. For, other than operating individually, there is a tendency amongst individual services to look upon each SF unit as their singular preserve, thereby compromising ‘jointness’ and integrated mission capability. However, such force abundance spawns operational problems. Thereafter, with airlift facilities provided to in the 1970s by the RAW’s secretive Aviation Research Centre, the SFF became a fully airborne jungle and mountain warfare unit. 30 caliber M1 semi-automatic carbines- and its M-2 and M-3 variants-and infiltrated its SG personnel into Chinese-occupied Tibet to gather intelligence and execute disruptive raids. The link to the first part that was carried by The Citizen is : NEW DELHI: In its formative years, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIAs) paramilitary wing alongside the Indian Army, trained and armed the SFFs largely Tibetan Khampa recruits.
This is the second part of Rahul Bedi’s analysis of the Indian Special Forces.
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